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I. Introduction:
On January 7, 2015, the Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act (“PRENDA”) was introduced in
the Senate.1 The purpose of the proposed bill was to prohibit abortions based on the sex of the
fetus.2 The proposed Act would have imposed criminal penalties on anyone who knowingly or
knowingly attempts to:
(1) Perform an abortion knowing that the abortion is sought based on the
sex or gender of the child,
(2) Use force or the threat of force to intentionally injure or intimidate any
person for the purpose of coercing a sex-selection abortion,
(3) Solicit or accept funds for the performance of such an abortion, or
(4) Transport a woman into the United States or across a state line for the
purpose of obtaining such an abortion.3
Similar bills have been proposed many times in recent years.4 For example, in 2012, the
United States House of Representatives considered the “Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of
2012.” The Act would have prohibited sex discrimination against an unborn child by proscribing
the killing of the fetus based on his or her sex. A bipartisan majority of the House (246-168)
voted in favor of PRENDA, but a two-thirds vote was necessary for passage.5 The 2015
proposed bill defined "sex-selection abortion" as an abortion undertaken to eliminate a fetus
based on the sex or gender of the child. It excluded from the definition of "abortion" actions
taken to terminate a pregnancy if the intent is to save the life or preserve the health of the unborn
child, remove a dead unborn child caused by spontaneous abortion, or remove an ectopic
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pregnancy.6 The proposed bill was accompanied by legislative findings asserting that a majority
of the American public, as well as the American medical community, support a prohibition on
sex-selection abortions.7
Additionally, in 2007, the United States delegation led a resolution calling on countries to
condemn sex-selection abortion at the Annual Meeting of the Commission of the Status of
Women, 51st Session, yet sex-selection abortions were not expressly prohibited by the United
States law or the laws of 47 states.8 During this session, the United Nations Commission on the
Status of Women urged governments of all nations “to take necessary measures to prevent…
prenatal sex selection.”9 Furthermore, the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
(“ASRM”) expressed concerns about the potential for “inherent gender discrimination,” the “risk
of psychological harm to sex-selected offspring,” and the “reinforcement of gender bias in
society as a whole” that is associated with sex-selection abortion.10 The American Congress of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (“ACOG”) and the American Association of Pro-Life
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (“AAPLOG”) also argued that sex-selection abortion poses
dangers to American society, including sexist practices, danger to the health of pregnant mothers,
and the risk of “dehumanization” and “new eugenics.”11
This Note argues that, despite the positions of these professional associations, laws
prohibiting sex-selection abortion prohibition should not be enacted for two reasons: (1) the
prohibition places an undue burden on women seeking an abortion and (2) Congress has no
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constitutional authority to enact a law like this.12 Part II of this Note discusses the background
and origin of the increasing concern about sex-selection abortions in the United States, and the
influence of other countries on American legislation. Part III explains the existing framework of
abortion law in the United States, and demonstrates that a ban on sex-selection abortion cannot
be reconciled with longstanding precedent, specifically the “undue burden” test. Part IV
examines whether the Constitution empowers Congress to create a federal sex-based abortion
ban under the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause. Part V discusses the moral
and ethical claims that drive the argument in favor of a ban on sex-selection abortion. Part VI
proposes alternatives to a federal ban on sex-selection abortion. Part VII concludes that the
policy concerns related to the practice of sex-selection abortions do not justify enacting an
unconstitutional law.
II. Background/History:
A. States that Have Adopted Sex-Selection Bans
Only six states ban abortions based on the sex of the child: Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota,
North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania, and South Dakota.13 Illinois became the first state
to adopt such a law in 1975.14 The law states "no person shall intentionally perform an abortion
with knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely on account of the sex of
the fetus."15 The law includes an exception for abortions related to genetic disorders. Later in
1989, Pennsylvania enacted The Abortion Control Act, which states that physicians may only
perform abortions that are “necessary” and “no abortion which is sought because of the sex of
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the unborn child shall be deemed a necessary abortion.”16 In 2011, Arizona enacted the Susan B.
Anthony and Fredrick Douglass Prenatal Discrimination Act, which imposed criminal penalties
on those who “perform an abortion knowing that the abortion sought is based on the sex or race
of the child or the race of a parent of that child."17 Most recently, North Dakota became the first
state to sign into law a ban on sex-selection abortions using the AUL Model legislation.18 This
law considers the following a class A misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year in prison:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a physician may not
intentionally perform or attempt to perform an abortion with knowledge
that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion solely: (a) on account of
the sex of the unborn child; or (b) because the unborn child has been
diagnosed with either a genetic abnormality or a potential for a genetic
abnormality.
The anti-choice group American United for Life (“AUL”) supported the North Dakota
bill, creating model language for states and the federal government to use in legislation.19
B. Origin of Sex-Selective Abortions
Sex-selection abortions are most common in China, India, and South Korea, where there
is a strong desire in families for the birth of boys.20 These countries use sex-selection as a tool
for gender discrimination because they highly promote patriarchal values.21 In India, for
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example, the birth of a son is associated with social, political, and economic entitlement.22
Coincidentally, India is also cited as having the starkest disparity between the birth ratio of boys
versus girls.23 While the normal at-birth ratio for boys to girls is 1000 to 952, the birth ratio in
India is 1000 to 943.24 Furthermore, South Korean statistic reflects a 1.52 son ratio for every 1
daughter in cases of second pregnancies.25 Certain scholars assume that this disparity in birth
ratio is a result of sex selection procedures.26 While male preference was largely established
through infanticide in previous eras, new prenatal technology has made it easier to abort a child
before she is even born.27 The concern resulting from the change in birth rate lends itself onto
the ongoing conversation among anti-abortion legislators and groups in the United States.28
Many of the proposed bills advocating for a ban on sex-selection abortion contain extensive
references to sex-selection in countries such as India.29
Furthermore, recent surveys, individual interviews, and focus groups have indicated that
sex preference also exists in America, especially among the Asian American community.30
Although a simple preference does not necessarily lead to specifically targeting the abortions of
female fetuses, it is true that advances in reproductive technology have made it possible to
identify the sex of a fetus at earlier stages of pregnancy.31 Preference of a certain sex has also
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Id at 64.
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Sujatha Jesudason and Anat Shenker-Osorio, Sex Selection in America: Why It Persists and How We
Can Change It, THE ATLANTIC (May 31, 2012) http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/05/sexselection-in-america-why-it-persists-and-how-we-can-change-it/257864/.
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contributed to seven states passing sex-selection bans.32 For example, the Gallup poll, taken in
2011, found that forty-nine percent of Americans preferred the birth of a boy as compared to
twenty-two percent who found the birth of a girl preferable.33
In lawmaking, the seven states took into account the attitudes and practices of Chinese
and Indians as evidence for passing the ban.34 The difficulty in using these statistics lies within
drawing a line between when it is acceptable to intervene in the woman’s decision-making
autonomy on abortion and “applying the notions of ‘choice’ to germinate restrictive notions of
gender.”35 While it is important to take into consideration statistics from other countries, it is
equally critical to note that the implications of limitations on abortions in America differ vastly
than those of other countries. For one, there is a key difference in legal frameworks between
other countries and the United States as illustrated by principle cases such as Roe v. Wade and
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.36 Additionally, there is no evidence demonstrating that
individuals, in fact, do act upon their desire to predetermine the sex of their child.37 Therefore, it
is best to analyze any existing sex-selection problem in America through the accurate
constitutional lens.
C. Sex-Selection in the United States
Although gender preference is a proven problem in other countries, in order to determine the
constitutionality of PRENDA, it is important to determine whether sex-selection is a reason
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Kalantry, supra note 23 at 63-64.
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women seek an abortion in the United States. In a 2014 empirical study conducted by Cornell
University Law School, researchers attempted to uncover the myths behind sex-selective
abortion laws in the United States.38 One of the myths unraveled in this study states that “malebiased sex ratios at birth are proof that sex-selection abortions are occurring.”39 The study
explains that these ratios are misleading in light of newer technology such as “sperm sorting,”
that allow the fertilization of an egg with a desired sex even before insemination.40 Therefore,
the proponents of sex-selection bans are quick to jump to the conclusion that any disparity in sex
ratios are solely due to abortions.41 In light of such studies, both quantitative and qualitative
studies have presented controversial conclusions as to sex-selection abortions.42 In some studies,
the ethnic communities studied constituted a very small proportion of the wider American
population.43 Additionally, the disparate ratios in the studies were not clearly explained.44
Therefore, “neither opponents nor proponents of sex-selective abortion bans strengthen their case
by arguing that there is no desire to select for sex or that sex selection is a rampant problem in
the [United States].”45
III. The Constitutional Right to Abortion
A. Existing Abortion Framework in the United States

38

Brian Citro et al., Replacing Myths with Facts: Sec-Selective Abortion Laws in the United States,
CORNELL LAW FACULTY PUBLICATIONS (June 2014) http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/1399.
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Id. at 6.
40
Id. at 7. The process known as sperm sorting allows sex selection achieved by a technique known as
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). Medical professionals remove eggs from a woman and fertilize
them outside of the body using a procedure called in-vitro fertilization (IVF). Only the embryos of the
desired sex are implanted in the uterus.
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Many countries have addressed sex-selection abortions with prohibitions, but it is harder
for the United States to do so, given that its legal precedent gives preference to individual
autonomy and personal preference over “societal effects, limiting the birth rate, and the status of
women.”46 The United States Supreme Court has laid out the basis of the abortion framework.
Before viability, the state cannot pass measures that pose an “undue burden” on the woman’s
ability to obtain an abortion.47 Because the United States legal framework on abortion is already
developed, proponents of the sex-selection abortion ban would have to carve out a prohibition
within the existing framework.48
While States cannot directly interfere with a woman’s decision-making before the fetus is
viable, the Supreme Court has left power amongst the states to place certain restrictions on when
an abortion can be performed; what kind of medical procedures can be used; and what
information the State can require doctors to provide pregnant women who are seeking an
abortion. An attempt to enact federal legislation such as PRENDA will begin a complex
constitutional discussion about whether banning sex-selection abortions will infringe on liberty
and privacy interests.49
i. Roe v. Wade
In Roe v. Wade, the Court found that the right of privacy within the Fourteenth
Amendment encompasses a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy.50 While recognizing
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Webb, supra note 20 at 263.
Casey, 505 U.S at 877-78.
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Webb, supra note 20 at 263.
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Webb, supra note 20 at 264.
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Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). “…No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
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liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws…” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. CONST. amend.
IX.
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the right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy, the Court also recognized the State’s right to
safeguard the health of both woman and child.51 Therefore, the privacy right of a woman in
terminating a pregnancy is not absolute.52 However, because a woman’s right to terminate her
pregnancy falls within the right of privacy, which is a “fundamental right,” any restrictions on
that right must be justified by a “compelling state interest.”53
The Court concluded that the balance between the woman’s right and the state’s interest
changes over the course of the pregnancy.54 In the first trimester, the woman’s interest is
paramount, and “the decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant woman’s attending physician.”55 The government may not prohibit abortions and may
regulate them only as it regulates other medical procedures.56 In the second trimester, “the State,
in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion
procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.”57 Finally, in the third trimester,
“the State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may if it chooses, regulate,
and even prescribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for
the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”58
ii. Planned Parenthood v. Casey
Although Casey reaffirmed that a woman has a constitutionally protected right to choose
to terminate a pregnancy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,59 the
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Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
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Court rejected the trimester framework previously set forth in Roe. In its place, it adopted a new
analytical framework under which the state may not place “undue burdens” on a woman’s right
to choose to terminate a pregnancy pre-viability.60 An “undue burden,” as defined by the Court
in Casey, means the placement of a “substantial obstacle” in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus.61 The Court explained that this standard does not preclude states
from attempting to persuade women to choose childbirth over an abortion.62
In this case specifically, the Court decided that the following restrictions under
the Pennsylvania law did not unduly burden a woman seeking an abortion: (1) informed
consent/24-hour waiting period; (2) parental consent; (3) additional record keeping; and
(4) narrow medial emergency exception .63 The Court concluded, however, that spousal
consent was unduly burdensome for a woman seeking an abortion.64
After the holding of Casey, a new issue was presented questioning when an
obstacle was a “substantial” obstacle.65 The Court distinguished between a costly
abortion, which was not considered to be an obstacle, from a statute that prevented a
“large fraction” of women from exercising their right to abortion, which was considered
to be a substantial obstacle.66 While the Court left lower courts to analyze what is
substantial and what is not, no determinative framework had been established.67 The
Court did, however, decide that a statute substantially hindered women’s free choice if it
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Id. at 872-73.
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consisted of unnecessary health regulations and if it interfered with a woman’s ability to
make a free choice pre-viability.68 Despite the attempt at specificity, these two examples
still left lower courts with many inferences to make regarding what statutes are
unconstitutional under the Casey framework.
Subsequent state and federal statutes have been tested under the undue burden standard to
discern the parameters of permissive regulation. In Stenberg v. Carhart, the court struck down a
Nebraska law banning “dilation and extraction” (D&E) abortions because it was unduly
burdensome on the woman’s right to choose to terminate her pregnancy.69 The Court reasoned
that because the method of D&E was the most common form of abortion method for performing
pre-viability, second trimester abortions, restricting its use on pregnant women would be unduly
burdensome.70 The Court differentiated the Nebraska law from similar laws in Kansas, Utah,
and Montana, which were tailored to proscribing the use of a specific type of D&E procedure.
By limiting the restriction to just one type of method, these states, the Court reasoned, were not
placing an undue burden on the woman seeking an abortion, particularly because other methods
of abortion were available.71 The concurring opinion in Stenberg went on to describe a statute
that it would have held constitutional under the undue burden test: one that places a ban on
partial-birth abortion that only proscribes one method of abortion and included an exception to
“preserve the life and health of the mother.”72
The Court’s example in Stenberg came to life in 2007, in Gonzales v. Carhart 550 U.S.
124 (2007)., where a similar law on partial-birth abortion was upheld because "[r]egulations
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which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the State . . . may express
profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to
the woman's exercise of the right to choose."73 This Act was distinguishable from the law in
Stenberg because it described the procedure specifically so that doctors would not be prosecuted
for performing D&E, which is legal.74 Additionally, the law specified a specific form of D&E
that was prohibited, rather than and entire range of D&E procedures, and it included an
exception for the health of the mother.75 Currently, the legal framework on abortion in America
is characterized by balancing the competing interest of a woman's reproductive autonomy and
the State interest in fetal life and in the woman's health.76
B. The Application of the Undue Burden Standard to Prohibitions on SexSelection Abortions
Generally, restrictions on abortion require a showing that the regulations do not impinge
on the two recognized bases for a woman's right: (1) the health of the mother and (2) her right to
choose whether or not to have a child within a limited window of her pregnancy.77 On the other
hand, the state also reserves the right to protect interest in potential life.78 Traditionally the
framework for abortion regulation has been seen as a compromise between women’s
reproductive rights and the state’s interest in protecting potential life.79 In order to assess
prohibitions on sex-selection abortion under the Casey framework, however, Courts must ask
whether the nature of a woman’s right is unduly burdened by the regulation at hand.80

73

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007).
Id. at 141.
75
Id.
76
Gillette, supra note 12 at 664.
77
Webb, supra note 20 at 269.
78
Id. at 273.
79
Id.
80
Id.
74

13

Proponents of a ban on sex-selection abortions argue that a prohibition would protect
rather than limit, a women’s rights of health and choice. They argue that women bear the social
burden of producing sons and are often punished if they do not.81 Furthermore, proponents of
the ban argue the coercion and perhaps violence that stems from deciding to forego a sexselective abortion negates a woman’s right of health.82 Additional consequences of such an
abortion on women’s health include psychological harm and emotional trauma.83 Similarly,
because of coercion to abort, a woman’s interest in choice might also be at risk. “Sex-selective
abortion regulation thus acknowledges that sex-selective abortion threatens the right of the
mother by depriving her of her right [to] govern her body and parenting choice.”84
In contrast, opponents of legislation to ban sex-selection abortion argue that such laws are
a “novel” and “aggressive” intrusion on a women’s right to choose.85 They note that while male
preference might be prevalent in countries such as China and India, there is less intense sexism
and discrimination in the United States.86 In response to the burden of bearing sons, opponents
of the sex-selection ban argue that the power to decide will give woman the option to refuse
giving birth to sons and even avoid motherhood altogether.87 Moreover, proponents of sex
selection point to the advantage of avoiding sex-linked diseases by allowing women to abort
children with such infirmities.88

Jodi Danis, Recent Development: Sexism and “The Superfluous Female”: Argument for Regulating
Pre-Implantation Sex Selection, 18 Harv. Women’s L.J. 219, 224 (1995).
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In light of the Court’s analysis in Casey and subsequent decisions, the opponents appear
to have the stronger arguments. One of the major flaws with PRENDA is that it subjects women
who are seeking an abortion to intense scrutiny, thus reversing the established framework under
Casey.89
First, it inadvertently places certain classes of women at a higher level of scrutiny
because of the preconceived notion that many of these women come to the United States to seek
a “safe haven” away from the restrictive abortion legislation in their countries.90 Specifically, a
federal ban risks subjecting Asian women to strict scrutiny by their doctors when seeking an
abortion, solely because these groups of women are the ones who typically come to America for
sex-selection abortions91. Some might argue that a sex-selection abortion ban places a burden
upon less than one percent of the women seeking abortions.92 This argument, however, does not
save the ban from facial invalidity, for an analysis of facial invalidity looks to the women who
might seek a reason-based abortion, not women who are seeking an abortion as a whole.93
Secondly, the “reporting requirement” under PRENDA would be ineffective, for there is
no actual way of finding out a woman’s true motivation behind an abortion.94 PRENDA mimics
the language of existing statutes in Illinois and Pennsylvania, which ban any abortions sought
“solely” on account of the sex of the fetus.95 Such language assumes that women have a single
reason for an abortion that can be easily determined.96 “Finding out the reason for abortion and

89

Eugene Park, Note: Hopping for Gender: The Unlawfulness of an Unregulated Market for Parental
Gender Selection and Selective Gender Abortion, 20 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 521, 546 (2014).
90
Id. at 531.
91
Id. at 546.
92
Id.
93
Donley, supra note 19 at 324.
94
Park, supra note 89 at 546.
95
Owen D. Jones, Sex Selection: Regulating Technology Enabling the Predetermination of a Child’s
Gender, 6 HARV. J. LAW & TEC 1, 44 (1992).
96
Id.

15

weeding out those aborting due to gender issues would be next to impossible.”97 The legal effect
of PRENDA becomes minimal when courts attempt to measure the subjective motives of a
pregnant woman.98 If a woman is physically coerced to undergo the abortion, it is unlikely that
she will bring a suit against her doctor or coercer because of the added pressure.99 Additionally,
in cases where the woman in socially or psychologically coerced to undergo a sex-selective
abortion, it again seems unlikely that she will later take action towards the doctor or the coercer.
Because the motivation of an abortion is indiscernible, a federal ban would be farreaching in nature. Using the North Dakota ban, for example, a sex-selection abortion goes
beyond an attempt to persuade a women against abortion; rather it prohibits the abortion
altogether.100 This is distinguishable from Gonzales, in which a specific procedure was banned
rather than a sweeping abortion ban.101 In fact, the Court in Gonzales made it clear that the ban
it was placing was dependent on the D&E procedure remaining available to women.102
Therefore, the Court’s ruling should be read as to only prevent any true pre-viability abortion
ban.103 The North Dakota abortion ban, however, exceeds the ruling in Gonzales by outlawing
certain pre-viability abortions, contradicting the ruling in Casey.104
Furthermore, the criminal sanctions imposed by the government upon violators of
PRENDA make it problematic for medical professionals to perform any abortions on women.105
The proposed law prohibits any abortion that practitioners had “knowledge” of being motivated
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by sex-selection.106 Determining whether a medical professional had such knowledge is just as
impossible as determining a woman’s motivation for the abortion, if not more.107 Hence, the fear
of lawsuits can consequentially infringe on a woman’s right to access an abortion generally
because doctors and medical professionals will be reluctant to perform abortions.108 The breach
in the relationship between provider and patient is also of concern if a ban is placed upon sexselective abortion.109 While women might initially rely on a doctor’s expertise and advice on the
abortion they seek, such disclosures might be withheld in fear of criminal sanctions.110
Predicting the most negative outcome, it might even be possible that women would result into
seeking illegal abortions.111 Banning sex-selective abortions can endanger both the life of the
women and the child, risking the abuse and neglect of both.112
Additionally, in Casey, the Court did not discuss how the undue burden status would
apply in the event of “inconclusive or disputed medical authority, or where states exaggerate the
creditability of ill-supported studies and information.”113 PRENDA is based upon statistics from
foreign countries, such as China and India, and it is difficult to determine with the statistics at
hand whether or not sex-selection abortions pose a large enough problem in the United States.
Nevertheless, there are reported incidents where physicians express concerns when their patients
ask for an abortion based on gender preference.114 Once again, the lack of guidance by the
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Casey framework makes it hard to pick which one of these factors weigh heavier than the other
in analyzing the constitutionality of a PRENDA: simple statistics or factual accounts. As argued
commonly in abortion legislation, “the existence of some trivial reasons should not deter … from
the larger goal of protecting the right of women to make such decisions in the first place
[emphasis added] ….” With these contrasting outlooks, there is no predicting whether a larger
disparity in birth ratios would deem the ban unconstitutional. Ultimately, it is best to apply a
totality of circumstances test, under which it becomes apparent that the chances of PRENDA
surviving under a constitutional shield is slim.
IV. Congressional Authority
A. Congress’s Power under the Commerce Clause
Even if sex-selection bans pass the undue burden standard, it is not clear whether
Congress has the power to pass such legislation. The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to
regulate interstate commerce.115 Congress may regulate three broad categories under the
Commerce Clause: the use of channels of interstate commerce; the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; and activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce.116 Abortion does not fit into the first two categories, so the only
way Congress would have the power to pass a sex-selection abortion ban is by showing that there
is a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.117
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The Court in United States v. Lopez held that the link between national productivity and
possession of firearm was too attenuated.118 The Act under question in this case was the GunFree School Zones Act, which made it federal offense for any individual knowingly to possess
firearm in place that individual believes or has reasonable cause to believe is school zone.119 The
Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which made it a federal crime to knowingly
possess firearm in a school zone exceeded Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause.120 In
Lopez, the court developed a four-point analysis to determine whether there was a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce. First, the court observed that this Act was a criminal
statute that had nothing to do with commerce or any sort of economic activity.121 Second, the
court found that the Act contained no express jurisdictional hook, such as a limitation to a
discrete set of firearm possessions that have an explicit connection with interstate commerce.122
Third, the Court observed that the legislative history behind the Act contained no congressional
findings regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun possession in school zones.123
Finally, the decision in Lopez concluded that the connection between gun possession and
interstate commerce was too attenuated.124 Ultimately, the court rejected the Act because it
feared that anything could fall under Congressional power in the name of economic productivity,
including matters of family law such as marriage, divorce, and child custody. 125
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Similar to Lopez, a sex-selection abortion ban would not pass the test of “substantial
economic activity.”126 A ban on sex-selection abortion is not economic in nature; rather,
opponents of the ban argue that it is a way to regulate government moral disapproval of such
action hidden under the pretense of sex discrimination prevention.127 Traditionally, when
medical practice has been a matter of state police powers, the allocation of power to the federal
government is viewed as an infringement to the state’s right to regulate.128 For example, in
2006, the Supreme Court held that the federal Controlled Substance Act could not be used to
prosecute physicians who assist in suicide in states where suicide is already legal.129 The
reasoning behind this holding was that where states already had a reasonable position, there was
no need for the federal government to invalidate merely because of opposing views.130 A federal
sex-selection ban would be equality problematic because the regulation of abortion correlates
with “vastly different, and regionally correlated, public opinions.”131 Therefore, states are in the
best position to create laws banning sex-selection abortions.132
Additionally, the connection between sex-selection abortion and interstate commerce is
highly attenuated.133 For example, the report issued by the Committee on the Judiciary points to
the fact that some women travel out of state to obtain an abortion; however, there is no data
provided as to whether the purpose of these travels is specifically to obtain sex-selection
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abortions.134 The data, however, in this circumstance is skewed.135 It must be noted that the
economic impact is based on abortions as a whole.136 Sex-selective abortions only make up a
small portion of overall abortions. Hence, the numbers provided by the Committee is
misleading.137
Lastly, even if the sex-selection abortion ban contained a jurisdictional hook, it would
still fail three of the four elements presented under Lopez.138 First, under PRENDA, Congress
would not be regulating economic activity, but rather using moral arguments to impose stronger
restrictions on the medical profession in performing abortions.139 Second, legislative history that
attempts to demonstrate a link between sex-selection abortion and interstate commerce is
arguably “mere pretext,” motivated by the desire to simply pass the legislation based on moral
judgment.140 Third, the highly attenuated link between sex-selection abortion and interstate
commerce leads to the question whether PRENDA was intended for an economic purpose at all,
or rather was it simply put into place to regulate abortion.141 Ultimately, the decision to enact
bans sex-selection abortion falls in the hands of the individual states.
B. Congress’s Power under the Necessary and Proper Clause
Federalism-based concerns were further addressed in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, in which the Court assessed the constitutionality of the Affordable Care

134

Id.
Id. at 312.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. An example of inserting a jurisdictional hook to the ban on sex-selective abortions would be if the
criminal statute applied to women who travelled through interstate commerce to seek such an abortion.
Adding this jurisdictional hook would not serve a valid purpose regardless. Most women would seek an
abortion within their home state to avoid criminal sanctions under the law.
139
Donley, supra note 19 at 313.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 314.
135

21

Act.142 After finding that the law did not pass muster under the Commerce Clause, the Court
also concluded that the law could not be justified by the Necessary and Proper Clause.143 This is
premised around the fact that if “upholding the law based on the Commerce Clause implicates
principles of federalism, so would upholding the law based on the Necessary and Proper
Clause.144 An attempt to convince otherwise will be met with suspicion by the Court of the
government’s attempt to invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause simply to overlook any federal
intrusion into the states’ police power.145 Given that a sex-selection abortion ban does not pass
under the Commerce Clause, it is reasonable to assume that it similarly implicates federalism
concerns under the Necessary and Proper Clause because it attempts to regulate legislative health
and safety issues traditionally reserved for the states.146
V. Moral and Ethical Implications
Although sex-selection abortion bans are not likely to overcome a constitutional bar, there
are still deep-seated ethical and moral implications of the procedure. Son-preference was a
problem before the development of sex selection technology. Because of the availability of
modern technology, people are now allowed to subtly act on this preference and manifest
entrenched gender discrimination and inequity that result from sex-selection abortions.147 Two
principal concerns arise from sex selection. First, sex selection technology “distorts the nature
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sex ratio leading to a gender imbalance.” Second, “it reinforces discriminatory and sexist
stereotypes towards women by devaluing females.”148 There is a strong a possibility that a few
people desire sex-selection abortion for gender-discrimination purposes. However, the issue
becomes whether the gender-discrimination motive for abortion by a few is enough to lead to a
widespread rejection of sex-selection for non-medical reasons.149 Quite apparently, there is no
further analysis yet available on the matter to address the issue, but PRENDA does bring to light
new discussions with regard to sex-selection abortion
VI. Alternatives
Knowing that the passage of a federal sex-selection ban is difficult under constitutional
restraints, the better alternative would be to direct attention towards the growing prenatal gender
selection industry.150 Abortion is not the only way sex selection can be achieved; reproductive
technologies are a growing market without much regulation.151 Motives behind a woman’s
choice to have an abortion are difficult to determine, but it is easier to detect the use of prenatal
gender selection technology for non-necessary, non-life threatening reasons.152 Therefore, there
is a better chance of monitoring the use of such technology through federal and state agencies to
minimize harm to the consumer.153
In addition, the medical community can engage in self-regulation where individual
doctors may refuse to use sex selection technology for non-medical reasons.154 Of course, there
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are many obstacles to such regulation, such as some doctors taking advantage of the lucrative
market of sex-selection technology and the risk of doctors making certain decisions for the
woman.155 These effects might be avoided if professional medical associations and licensing
bodies were to place stringent regulations monitoring the use of sex selection technology.156 For
example, penalties on professional licenses must be placed by the medical community.157
Although self-regulation by doctors seems like the ideal solution to deter sex-selection abortions,
the use of sex selection technology is a growing market, that scientists and doctors do not wish to
overlook.
Much of the advocacy of the sex-selection abortion ban revolves around information and
statistics from abroad, often manipulated to garner support for the ban in the United States. If
proponents of the ban hope to pass legislation, the next step is to show the effects of sexselection abortion on individuals residing in the United States.158 Furthermore, instead of
reaching the conclusion of a ban, opponents of sex-selection abortions should first target public
awareness and education campaigns since much of the practice is taboo and goes
unmentioned.159
VII. Conclusion
The future of a federal sex-selection ban is a difficult one to justify. The sex-selection
abortion bans that have been enacted or proposed have been uniform.160 Any federal sexselective abortion ban will be invalidated based on an inappropriate use of enumerated federal
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powers and the current legal framework on abortion.161 The predicted unconstitutionality of a
federal ban does not, however, indicate that sex-selection abortions are not a problem in the
United States. Nevertheless, if attention must be given to the matter, better statistics on the
effects of sex-selection abortion on American females and fetuses must be provided.
Furthermore, states are better capable of balancing interests by drafting their statutes to reflect
more closely the differing standards that apply pre- and post-viability under Casey.162 For
example, pre-viability, states can focus on prohibiting abortions based “solely” on gender
preference.163 Post-viability, state prohibition can focus on the element of “knowledge.”
Creating such distinctions does not guarantee that sex-selection bans will pass the constitutional
muster, but it may maximize the effect of the ban.164
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